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affect the long-run state of the economy. An economy that is
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richer in the early stages is more likely to achiev e a long-ru n
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1. Introduction

Many development economists stress that a country's economic
development is closely linked to the development of financial
markets and financial intermediatio n in that country. Several
recent pieces of empirical research also support this view of
development.
McKinnon [1973] [1991], Fry [1988], and World Bank [1989]
emphasize that informationa l frictions in financial markets is
one important source of the underdevelopm ent trap in less
developed countries. In these countries, ill-defined property
leads to severe conflicts of interests among different groups.
Moral hazard and adverse selection problems that are closely
related to asymmetric information result in greater agency costs
in financial markets, and make the bankruptcy proceedings
difficult in the event where borrowers face financially
distressed. Therefore, the process of economic development could
be interpreted as the one of mitigating incentive conflicts in
financial markets. 1
The purpose of this model is to develop a model of
overlapping generations with production in the presence of
asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers.

We make

use of Townsend's [1979] costly-state -verification approach, in
1 Since the seminal work
of stiglitz and Weiss

(1981], many
inefficienci es in financial markets
have been analyzed in
frameworks with asymmetric information. More recently,
the
theoretical insights have been applied to macroeconomi c settings,
including Williamson [1987], Greenwood and Williamson [1989],
Bernanke and Gertler (1989] [1990], Greenwald and Stiglitz [1993],
and etc.

2

which

there is asymmet ric informa tion is on borrowe rs' project

returns and monitor ing by lenders is costly. 2

With a risk

neutral ity setting, a standard debt contrac t is derived as an
optimal contrac t, and financia l interme diation emerges
endogen ously. 3
We conside r a small open economy where agents can freely
have access to foreign safe assets with a constan t interes t rate.
However , our model differs from the ordinary small open economy
in the strict sense because borrowe rs can not borrow freely at
this rate because of the moral hazard problem . Our model is
similar to Bernank e and Gertler ( hereafte r, B-G) [1989] in that
the economy is a two-good s economy . Producti on of the final
consump tion good takes two steps.

First, individu al

entrepre neurs transfor m the consump tion good into the investm ent
good using their own risky projects . Second, competi tive firms
produce the consump tion good by employin g labor and the
investm ent good, accordin g to neoclas sical, constan t-return s-to
scale, product ion technolo gy. There is no asymmet ric informa tion
problem with product ion of the consump tion good, but that of the
2

As Greenwa ld and Stiglitz ( hereafte r, G-S ) [1993]
emphasi ze, the costly state verifica tion model is not the only one
describi ng capital market imperfe ctions. Other several kinds of
models in which adverse selectio n and signalin g process are
importa nt can explain the similar phenome non. However , I believe
that our approach is a useful one to associa te capital market
imperfe ctions with economic developm ent because the costly- state
verifica tion approach focuses attentio n on the process of
bankrup tcy. In practice , McKinnon [1973] [1991], Fry [1988], and
World Bank [1989] emphasiz e the role of technolo gy for bankrup tcy
proceed ings as one importan t source of underdev elopmen t.
3

See, for example , Diamond [1984] or Williams on [1986].

3

investment good involves a moral hazard problem.
Our model differs from B-G in one important respect. 4
Equilibria may be defined by credit rationing, as in Stiglitz and
Weiss [1981) or Williamson [1987). Only when borrowers default on
their debt, monitoring costs are incurred by intermediaries, and
these costs play an important role in hampering capital
accumulation through the effect of "credit rationing". However,
the extent of credit rationing is mitigated by internal funds
available to borrowers. The "net worth effect", as B-G have
called it, works to alleviate credit constraints, thus promoting
capital accumulation. 5

The effects of credit rationing and the

net worth effect are opposite with respect to capital
accumulation. The interplay of these two factors generates
business fluctuations.
More significantly, the net worth effect has a potential for
multiple stationary states. 6

Each stationary state is ordered

4

Strictly, another important difference is that, while they
employ stochastic monitoring, we employ only deterministic
monitoring, where monitoring occurs only with probability o or 1.
See, Townsend [1988] and Mookherjee and Png [1989) for costly
state-verification models with stochastic monitoring.
5

Other authors, such as Calomiris and Hubbard [1990], Froot
and Stein [1991), and G-S [1993), emphasize the importance of net
worth positions of borrowers on investment. Especially G-S
extensively investigates the question how net worth positions of
borrowers affect macroeconomics through the change in the firm's
risk-taking behavior.
6 B-G showed that the net worth effect leads to the dynamic
process in the Diamond's [1965) overlapping generations model even
in a small open economy setting, while G-S showed that the net
worth effect generates the cycle. However, both of them doesnot
refer to the possibility of multiple steady states.

4

according to the extent of credit rationing: in some states
credit is severely rationed by intermediarie s, while in other
states credit is expanded by them. Under the neoclassical ,
constant-ret urns-to-scal e, production technology, the wage rate
is an increasing function of the economy's capital-labo r ratio.
Thus, internal funds of borrowers available to projects, which
are equal to the wage rare, are higher as the capital-labo r ratio
increases. If an economy is initially poor, the long-run
equilibrium is poor, where credit is severely rationed and the
net worth positions of borrowers are low. Conversely, if the
economy is initially rich, the large internal funds of borrowers
enable intermediari es to expand the supply of credit, leading to
a long-run rich equilibrium.
The model contains an important implication for economic
development.

Over all, development is closely related to the

extent of financial development, which in turn is positively
linked to the wealth level of borrowers.

The wealth level is the

driving force behind development in a world of capital market
imperfection s.

Put another way, poverty generates poverty, while

wealth generates wealth. A country that is wealthier in the early
stages is more likely to achieve a wealthier state with developed
financial intermediatio n in the long run. Conversely, a country
which is poor in the early stages is more likely to fail in
development. Hence, the model might give an alternative insight
into economic development, as distinguished from much of the
other literature which emphasizes the role of accumulation of

5

knowledge or human capital as an engine of developme nt ( e.g.,
Romer [1986], Lucas [1988], Matsuyama [1991], and etc).
Recently, Galor and Zeira [1993] show that the initial
distributi on of wealth affects output in the long run in the
presence of indivisib ility in investmen t in human capital
together with capital market imperfect ions. In contrast, our
model implies that capital market imperfecti ons are sufficien t to
explain the long-run divergenc e in developme nt among countries .
In a closed economy setting, the multiple steady states
disappear .

This result is sharply contrasted with Diamond [1965]

because in his model multiple steady states may be viable in a
closed economy, but disappear in a small open economy. 7

When

agents cannot have access to foreign safe assets, the net worth
effect is not sufficien t to generate multiplic ity, but instead
generates the non-monot onic behavior of the interest rate as the
economy develops. This result suggests that too early
liberaliza tion of the domestic deposit market to world markets
may derive the developin g economy down to an underdeve lopment
trap, even if the world interest rate is less than the steady
state rate attained in the closed economy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
Section 2 sets out the basic structure of our model. Section 3
derives financial arrangeme nts under the costly-st ate-

7

Galor and Ryder [1989] demonstra ted that, if the elasticity
of saving on the real interest rate is sufficien tly negative,
multiple steady states may arise in the Diamond model in a closed
economy.

6

verification model. Section 4 analyzes the equilibria of the
model and demonstrates that there are multiple steady states.
Section 5 examines the effects of "financial repression", and
Section 6 the effects of income redistribution. Section 7
investigates the effects of the net worth effect in a closed
economy. Finally, some concluding remarks are made.

2. The Model with Asymmetric Information

Let us consider an overlapping generations economy with
intragenerational lending and borrowing.
At each period t = o, 1, .•. , oo, a continuum of agents who
live for two periods are born in each country. Agents are either
lenders or entrepreneurs, where a ( O <a< 1) is the fraction
of agents who are lenders and ( 1 - a) the fraction of agents
who are entrepreneurs. Equilibrium conditions are written in per
capita terms.
We make use of costly state verification approach originated
by Townsend [1979], in which there is asymmetric information on
borrowers' project returns and monitoring by lenders is costly.
Following B-G [1989] or Hamada and Sakuragawa [1992], we assume
that the production of the final consumption good take two
steps. 8

8

First, individual entrepreneurs transform the

This
assumption
simplifies
incentive
problems.
Alternatively, if we assume an one-sector model using production
function with two inputs, labor and the capital good, incentive
problems are more complicated because there emerges incentive
problems among three types of agents: borrowers, lenders, and
workers.

7

consump tion good into capital using their own risky project s, and
second, competi tive firms produces the consump tion good accordin g
to neoclas sical, constan t-return s-to-sca le, product ion technolo gy
by employin g labor and capital. Producti on in the consump tion
good is instanta neous and that in the investm ent good takes one
period. Capital depreci ates fully in one period. 9 The
consump tion good is numerai re.
The economy is a small open economy in which all agents
have access to foreign safe assets with a constan t interes t rate
r. However , our model differs from the ordinary small open
economy because borrowe rs can not borrow freely at this rate
because of a moral hazard problem.
Because product ion technolo gy of the consump tion-goo d firm
is homogen eous of degree one, output of the consump tion good can
be, without loss of general ity, describe d in terms of the actions
of a single, aggrega te, price-ta king firm. 10

Denote the per

capita aggrega te capital availabl e at period t by kt, and the
product ion of the consump tion good at period t by Yt· The
product ion function is, then, denoted in per capita terms by
(1)

Yt

=

f( kt),

where f(. ) is continuo usly differen tiable, strictly increasi ng
9

The model is easily extended to an economy where capital
depreci ates at a rate o ( o ~ o < 1 ).
10

Under the constan t-return s-to-sca le technolo gy, the firm
optimiz e only the capital- labor ratio. This fact justifie s the
specific ation of a single, aggrega te, price-ta king firm.

8

and concave, with f( o) = o, and
lim

f 1 (kt)

=

oo,

kc-0

The consumption-g ood firm purchases capital and hires labor in
spot markets.

Under the assumption of constant returns to scale,

factor payments completely exhaust output. From the maximization
problem of the firm, each input is paid its respective marginal
product. Under the assumption of one-period depreciation for
capital, the market price of the investment good is equated to
the marginal product of capital. We derive
(2)

Rt

=f

I ( kt ) ,

and

Wt

=f

( kt ) - k tf I ( kt ) ,

where Rt is the marginal product of capital and Wt the wage rate.
Each lender born at t maximizes the expected value of the
second period utility Et( ct+l - lt+l ), where Ct+l is consumption
at period t+l, lt+l the quantity of effort expended to observe
project returns at period t+l, and Et the expectation operator
conditional on information available at period t. In youth each
lender supplies a fixed one unit of labor to the consumption- good
firm and receives Wt as the wage rate. Lenders consume only when
old and hence save their income entirely either by lending to
some other agents or by investing in foreign assets.
Each entrepreneur also consumes only when old, and hence
maximizes the expected second period consumption Et( ct+l). Each
entrepreneur also supplies one unit of labor to the consumption
good firm and receives the wage rate Wt when young. Each

9

entrepreneur has access to only one investment project when
young. Each project is not transferable between agents. Each
project produces random w units of the investment good at period
t+l with an input of 8 units of the consumption good at period t.
Returns are independent and identically distributed across
entrepreneur s in one generation. w follows a uniform distribution
function over [

o,

2µ]

with a mean of µ. 10

An entrepreneur

who has realized w sells it to a consumption-g ood firm for a
market price Rt+l and receives Rt+ 1 w. Entrepreneur s differ in the
monitoring cost P, where p follows the probability density
function g( P ), which is continuously differentiab le on [

o, p+

J. Let G( p) denote the associated probability distribution
function. All agents can freely identify each entrepreneur by his
value of

p.

The actual realization of each project is freely observable
only to the project owner although all agents know its
distribution . Other agents must incur P units of effort to
observe the project return of the entrepreneur with

p. 11

Lenders are endowed with a unbounded quantity of effort. Both

10

The specific assumption on uniform distribution s would
simplify analysis without much sacrifice of the results derived
below. Almost all of our results are derived under a more general
distribution function H( w) so long as it satisfies
h(CJ>) +

Ph 1 (CJ>)

>O.

See, for example, Froot and Stein [1991).
11

Focus attention only on the case in which monitoring
deterministi c. See Townsend [1988) and mookherjee and Png [1989)
for stochastic monitoring.

10

types of agents are protected by the limited liability
constraints, such that ct~

o and lt

~

o.

The distribution s of~

and e are independent with each other.
Let ~ax ( < + oo) denote the maximum level of capital-labo r
ratio attainable. The maximum is realized when all entrepreneur s
operate their projects, such that ~ax=µ ( 1 - a), where the
maximum capital-labo r ratio is proportional to the number of all
the projects funded under the assumption that capital depreciates
fully in one period. We impose two Assumptions:

Assumption 1

and
Assumption 2
µf 1 ( ~ax)

> er.

Assumption 1 implies that all entrepreneur s have to raise outside
loans for their risky projects in any state of kt because Wt is
increasing in the capital-labo r ratio. This assumption makes the
incentive problem important. Next, from Assumption 2 and the fact
that f'(. ) is decreasing, it follows that
<3 >

µ Rt •

1 -

[

e-

wt

Jr >

wt

r.

The L.H.S. of (3) is the expected profit under perfect

11

information when any entrepreneur undertakes his project using
his wage income as internal funds, while the R.H.S. is
consumption when he invests her wage in foreign assets. (3)
implies that any entrepreneur would be more willing to fund his
project by borrowing than to invest in the safe asset at least
under perfect information.
Suppose that there are "many" foreign lenders who can
potentially lend to the entrepreneurs with an opportunity rate of
return r.
It is helpful to discuss these issues in a world of
symmetric information. In the absence of asymmetric information,
the first-best solution is always achieved. By Assumption 2, all
entrepreneurs receive loans from lenders and fund their
investment projects. At any period

kxnax is achievable and credit

rationing never occurs.

3. Debt contracts, Intermediation, and credit Rationing
An entrepreneur born at t must make a contract with a lender
born at tin order to receive ( 0 - Wt
project.

) units for operating his

Let us characterize the contract by a pair { L( w, ~+l

), S }, where L( w, Rt+i) is an integrable, positive payment
function, such that L( w, Rt+i)
and Sis a subset of w

€

(

o,

2µ

~

Rt+iW for any w

€

(

o,

2µ J

J in which monitoring occurs. We

restrict the type of contracts to the set of incentive compatible
contracts.
that

Consider an interest payment xt

€

(

o,

2µ

J, such

12

This condition ensures that all contracts under consideration
satisfy incentive compatibility.

Among the set of all incentive

compatible contracts, the contract satisfying the following
property is optimal:
for w

€

s

= [

w < xt ] ,

and

Let r denote the certain rate of interest prevailing
between period t and period t+l for which each lender has to be
compensated. The optimal contract is, then, characterized by a
pair { ~+lxt, ~+lfil }, which would maximize the expected return
of the entrepreneur with a loan of ( 8 - Wt) units required,
while giving the lender a level of expected return of at least r
per unit invested:
max
Xt

subject to

13

The contract form has the property of a standard debt contract
which Gale and Hellwig [1985] and Williamson [1986] have
described. If@~ xt, the entrepreneur pays ~+lxt to the lender
as interest payment, while, if@< xt, the entrepreneur defaults,
monitoring occurs, and the lender receives the whole return on
the project.

Thus, the state in which monitoring occurs is

interpreted as the state of bankruptcy.
Let us specify the institutiona l arrangement in which debt
contracts are written.

As Diamond [1984] and Williamson [1986]

have demonstrated , there is a possibility that financial
intermediatio n is formed in equilibria. 12

If 2Wt ~ 8, each

entrepreneur can fund her project from only one lender. Direct
lending prevails and hence contracts are written between
individual entrepreneur and lender.

In contrast, if 2Wt <

e,

the entrepreneur would have to make contracts with more than two
lenders in direct lending. In the event where the entrepreneur is
insolvent, each lender monitors her independently so that there
is a duplication of

monitoring in equilibria. In such a case,

there may be a room for any other institutiona l arrangement to be
considered as a means of eliminating the inefficient duplication
of monitoring.
Let n 9

(

xt) denote the expected profit of the entrepreneur

born at t;

12

Recently, several authors have analyzed the endogenous
formation of financial intermediatio n. See, for example, Diamond
and Dibvig [1983], Boyd and Prescott [1986], and Greenwood and
Jovanovic [1990].

14
(5)

Let n( xt, p) denote the expected profit of the intermediary
lender born at t from a loan to the entrepreneur with

P;

(6)

The first term is the expected return when the entrepreneur is
insolvent, the second term the expected interest payments, and
the third the expected monitoring costs born by the intermediary ,
where xt/2µ is the probability of bankruptcy.
For the entrepreneur with a characterist ic

P,

Xt satisfies

(7)

subject to the individual rationality condition of the
intermediary , such that
(7,)

where (7') states that the intermediary must be compensated for (
6 - Wt )r units for lending to the entrepreneur .
Differentiat ing (6) with respect to xt gives
13

Strictly, the lender who actually makes loans may be an
individual lender or an intermediary lender, depending on parameter
values. However, we call him the intermediary lender because the
allocation under intermediated economy reproduces the same
allocation as achieved in direct lending when direct lending
survives.

15
(8)

where xt is defined over [ o, 2µ ].
In order to guarantee positively-va lued interest payments
over the whole region, we impose the following assumption.

Assumption 3

14

For the shape of n(. ), under Assumption 3 three properties hold:
(9)

= -

(9 I)

lim n 1 (

xt➔2µ

1

-Rt:+1 < o,
2µ

. ) =

- _!.
2µ

< o,

and,
( 9")

for any O < P < p+, and O ~ kt+l ~

~ax•

As illustrated in Figure

2, these three properties ensure that for any entrepreneur with p
n(xt,

P)
14

is strictly concave in xt and reaches a maximum for some

Without Assumption 3, there exists a range of capital
labor ratio, above which n( xt, p ) is monotonic decreasing as
depicted at the dotted curve in Figure 2.

16

interior, and that generates a possibility of equilibrium credit
rationing as in Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] and Williamson [1987].
Incorporatin g n( xt, P) = o in (8) into (6), we
obtain the expected maximum profit that any intermediary can earn
from loans to the entrepreneur with P, such that

(10)

given ~+l· If (10) exceeds or equals the profit from the
alternative investment
(11)

it is attractive for the intermediary to supply loans to the
entrepreneur with P, but if (10) is strictly less than (11), it
is attractive rather to invest in the safe asset. If there are
interior equilibria, there exist cutoffs Pt, such that 0 <Pt<

p+,

satisfying

(12)

given Wt and ~+ 1 , since (10) is a strictly decreasing function
of

p.

The entrepreneur with Pt is denoted by the marginal

entrepreneur .

If equilibria involve (12), entrepreneur s with

monitoring costs p

~

Pt can receive loans, while those with P >

17
Pt cannot and thus credit rationed. The latter class of borrowers
do not receive loans in spite of the fact that they would be
willing to pay higher than market-determined rates in order to
have access to their investment projects. As in Stiglitz and
Weiss [1981] and Williamson [1987], the fact that the expected
return from a loan of one unit to the borrowers would fall below
the opportunity return generates credit rationing. The former
class of borrowers who actually receive loans promise to pay loan
interest rates which are implicitly determined by
1l (

given wt and

Xt,

p)

=

0r,

Rt+i·

It is useful to calculate the expected profit of the
marginal entrepreneur who undertakes his risky project by debt:
(13)

while the profit from the safe investment is Wtr. Whether
equilibria will be characterized by credit rationing depends on
parameter values. If (13) exceeds Wtr, and hence if
(14)

the neighboring entrepreneur with a higher monitoring cost is
credit rationed, and hence the equilibria are characterized by

18

credit rationing, defined by (12). 15

Whenever the condition

(14) is satisfied, the inequality is also satisfied for the
entrepreneur with a higher monitoring cost adjacent to the
marginal entrepreneur because entrepreneurs are assumed to be
continuously ordered in terms of the monitoring cost.
Conversely, if the inequality of (14) is reversed, such that
( 14')

equilibria do not involve credit rationing. The marginal
entrepreneur is now defined by the borrower who is indifferent
between undertaking his risky project or investing his internal
funds in the safe asset, such that
ne( xt, Pt) = Wtr,
or equivalently,
(15)

The entrepreneur adjacent to the marginal entrepreneur then would
be more willing to choose the safe investment rather than the
risky project and hence is never credit rationed.
We define equilibria where the condition (14) is satisfied
as credit rationing equilibria (CRE), and those where,
15

Combining xt satisfying n 1 ( xt, P) = o in (8) into (13)
yields the expected profit of the marginal entrepreneur. By
comparing it with the alternative return [ e - Wt Jr, we obtain
( 14) .

19

alternatively, the condition (14') is satisfied as no credit
rationing equilibria (NCRE). In general, equilibria may involve
both regions of CRE and of NCRE simultaneously. However, in this
section we proceed with the analysis focusing only on CRE, where
(14) is always satisfied. This procedure may be restrictive but
it is without loss of generality from two reasons. First, as
analyzed below in the Appendix, the qualitative results in NCRE
are almost the similar to those in CRE. 16

Second, as

demonstrated below, there exist equilibria which are CRE over the
whole region.

4. Multiple Steady States

In this section we incorporate the ingredients representing
capital market imperfections into a general equilibrium setting.
The aggregate quantity of capital at period t+l equals the
average return of each projectµ times the number of projects
funded at period t, such that
(16)

16

See the Appendix [1][2] in details.

17

If the depreciation rate is o ( O ~
the law of motion of capital is rewritten as

o

~ 1 ), in general

« )G(Pt) + (1 - a)kt.
Then, the dynamic process would be a little complicated, but the
qualitative results reproduce the economy with o = 1, represented
by (16).
kt+l

= µ( 1 -

20

From the application of the implicit function theorem, there
exists a continuously differentiable function P:[ 0, JsnaxJ

➔

[

0,

p+ J, such that
(1 7 )

kt+ 1

= µ ( 1 - a) G( J3 (kt+ 1 )

) ,

with pl ( • ) > 0 , and

J3 ( 0 ) = 0 •

Incorporating (2), (2') and
(17')

into (12), we describe the functional relation between the
capital level in two successive periods as

where m( kt) is the "cost of lending" and n( kt+l) the "benefit
of lending", defined by

and
[f/ (kt+1) -

(20)

PCkt+1) )2

n (kt+1) = µ _ _ _ _ _ _ _2_µ_ __
f 7 (kt+1)

By (17), Assumption 1 and 3, m(.) and n(.) are strictly
decreasing and positive-valued, and

21

Lemma 1
n( kt+l ) ➔

00

as kt+l ➔

o.

Proof.

since

Q.E.D.

In economic terms, (19) captures the "net worth effect" as
B-G have called.

That is, an increase in kt gives rise to an

increase in internal funds available to entrepreneurs, which
tends to reduce the intermediary's cost of lending.

(20)

captures two reasons why the intermediary's benefit of lending
declines as kt+l increases.

First, an increase in kt+l is

associated with loans to borrowers of lower quality.

Second, an

increase in kt+l gives rise to a reduction of the price of the
investment good. Both elements tend to lead to a reduction of the
intermediary's profit.
Figure 2 illustrates one typical case where the economy
converges to a unique interior stationary state. The stationary
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state exhibits credit rationing.

The story behind the dynamic

adjustment process is as follows.

Given the initial capital

level k 0 which is less thank, intermediaries will expand the
supply of credit.

The credit expansion induces a rise in the

wage rate. The rise in the wage rate simultaneously implies an
increase in internal funds available to entrepreneurs, which in
turn, mitigates credit constraints, leading to further capital
accumulation.

Proposition 1

If m( kutax) > n( kutax ), there exist interior stationary
equilibria.

Proof. Both of m(. ) and n(. ) are continuous over [ 0, kutax ].

Using Lemma 1, if m( kutax) > n( kutax ), there exist interior
values to satisfy m(. ) = n(. ) from the application of the
intermediate value theorem. Q.E.D.

Conversely, if m( kutax) < n( kutax ), kutax is a stationary
state, where all borrowers can fund their projects in the absence
of credit rationing.
Consider an example in which we specify the probability
distribution function of the monitoring cost by G( p) = cpb,
with b > 0 and c >

o. Specifically, the case with parameter

values of 0 = 0.55, a= 0.76, µ

= 1.25, and a= 0.5

qualitatively replicates an economy with a unique interior steady
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state, described in Figure 2. 18
for any k 0 € (

o,

Given the parameter values,

0.3 ], there is a unique equilibrium which

converges to the steady state E, which is globally stable. If the
initial state k 0 , which represents the initial number of projects
funded, is smaller (greater) thank, then the initial wage rate

w0

is smaller (greater) than the steady state wage rate

w.

kt

and Wt are monotonically increasing (decreasing) and eventually
approach the steady state value.
However, because both of the curves slope downward, there
may be multiple intersections. We obtain the following
Proposition.

Proposition 2
There is a function G(. ) which exhibits multiple steady
states.

Proof. See the Appendix [4].

See Figure 3. Suppose at first that 0 is relatively large, for
example, 0 = 0 1 • n( kt+l) and m( kt) uniquely intersect at A.
There is only one steady state.

When 0 is decreased and other

parameters are held constant, m( kt) shifts down while n( kt+l)
does not move. There are two steady states B1 and B2 for 0 2
0.34088.

states

=

For some smaller values than 0 2 , there are three steady

c 1 , c2 ,

and

c3 •

That is, there exists 0 3 such that 0.3354

18 The proof appears in the Appendix [3].
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< 83 < 82

= 0.34088.

Hence, as 8 becomes smaller, the loan size

tends to be smaller, permitting incentive constraints to be more
mitigated.

Figure 3 illustrates one example that, for relatively

small values of 8,

multiple steady states are more likely to

emerge.
As Figure 4 illustrates, if k 0 < k, kt monotonically
converges to

k, while if k 0

>

k, kt reaches the upper bound

~ax

after some finite number of periods. There are three steady
states,

k, k,

and ~ax• The long-run state depends entirely on

the initial state of the economy, which is
or

w0

).

represented by k 0 (

Two interior steady states are associated with credit

rationing in which some borrowers are credit rationed.
two equilibria,
unstable.

Among the

k is dynamically stable and k is dynamically

The corner solution Jsnax is characterized by a state

without credit rationing, and

is dynamically stable.

The long-run state of the economy is historically
determined, depending on the initial wealth level.

If the

economy is initially poor with only the small numbers of projects
funded, the small net worth positions of borrowers prevent
lenders from expanding the supply of credit. Credit is severely
rationed and only the borrowers of relatively high quality (
small monitoring costs) can receive loans. In contrast, if the
economy is initially rich with large numbers of projects funded,
the high net worth positions of borrowers enable intermediaries
to expand the supply of credit.
quality can receive loans.

Even the borrowers of low

Eventually there emerges a state in
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which all entrepreneurs receive loans and wages are high.
The logic behind the multiple steady states is as follows.
At a poor state with a small capital-labor ratio, the small net
worth requires large outside loans for funding of their projects.
The induced large agency costs prevent intermediaries from
expanding the supply of credit. The feedback between small net
worth and severe credit constraints reinforces the low income
trap.

However, the net worth of borrowers is greater as the

economy is wealthier because the wage rate is an increasing
function of the capital-labor ratio. Thus, we may have another
steady state with credit more expanded. If the economy is at a
rich state with a higher capital-labor ratio, the agency costs
are smaller due to small loans required, mitigating credit
constraints. The high net worth positions of borrowers enable
intermediaries to expand the supply of credit, which in turn
leads to a rise in the wage rate and so on.

Now the feedback

reinforces the long-run state without credit rationing.
In order to show that the existence of multiple steady states
is closely related to the net worth effect, it is useful to
examine an alternative economy where only the lenders work in the
first period of life. Suppose that entrepreneurs do not work in
both periods of life, and that any other assumptions remain
unchanged. The only difference from the above model is that all
entrepreneurs have to borrow e units from intermediaries at any
stage, and thus (18) is replaced by
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(18')

Since n(. ) is a monotonic decreasing function of kt+l' (18')
determines a unique capital-labor ratio, and the dynamic process
disappears.
We could measure the extent of financial intermediation or
financial "depth" as the number of risky projects funded.

Our

model, then, implies the positive relation between internal
wealth of borrowers, saving and investment channelled through
financial intermediation. In this regard, our analysis is closely
parallel to Gurley and Shaw [1967] and to McKinnon [1973], who
insists that a country's economic development is closely linked
to the "depth" of financial intermediation in that country.
Different initial conditions are associated with different
long-run states in our model. Multiple steady states arise also
in an one-sector overlapping generations model pioneered by
Diamond [1965] in a closed economy, if the elasticity of saving
on the real interest rate is sufficiently negative, as has been
demonstrated by Galor and Ryder (1989]. 19 Our multiple steady
states arise in a small open economy setting, the result of which
is contrasted with Diamond. 20

The initial wealth level of

19

Galor [1992], alternatively, develops a two-sector
overlapping generations model, and shows that multiple steady
states are consistent in the model when the elasticity of saving on
the real interest rate is positive.
20

At least to my knowledge, there is scarce evidence to
support this condition. For example, Hall (1988] shows that
consumption and hence saving is almost independent of the real
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borrowers dictates the long-run capital-labo r ratio through the
interaction between credit rationing and net worth effects. An
economy with a high initial level of wealth achieves a wealthy
state with developed financial intermediatio n, while an economy
with a low level is forced to a stagnant state with less
developed financial intermediatio n in the long run.
our analysis contains an important implication for the link
between economic development and financial development.

There is

reciprocal causation between both developments , which is
channelled through internal wealth positions of borrowers.

The

initial wealth level itself is the driving force behind
development.

Put another way, poverty generates poverty, while

wealth generates wealth under capital market imperfection s. A
country which is relatively richer in the early stages of
development is more likely to succeed in development, whereas a
country which is initially poor is more likely to be forced to a
low income trap with less developed financial intermediatio n. 21
Hence, the model might give an alternative insight into economic
development, as distinguished from much of the other literature

interest rate, using the post-war data in the United States.
21

It may be argued that it is highly artificial to identify
equilibria associated with capital market imperfection s in terms of
credit rationing. According to historical evidence, low income
traps associated with less developed financial markets may not be
typically featured by credit rationing, but may be described by
underinvestm ent or governments' regulations on financial markets (
see, for example, McKinnon (1973] ). One advantage of our use of
credit rationing to describe equilibria is that equilibria are
numerically solvable under some parameter values to make it
possible to prove the existence of multiple steady states.
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which emphasizes the role of accumulation of knowledge or human
capital as an engine of development ( e.g., Romer [1986], Lucas
[1988], Matsuyama [1991], and etc).

our model predicts that the

difference in the initial wealth levels of countries would be
sufficient to derive their long-run divergence under capital
market imperfection s. Recently, Galor and Zeira [1993] show that
the initial distribution of wealth affects output in the long run
in the presence of indivisibilit y in investment in human capital
together with capital market imperfection s. In contrast, our
model implies that capital market imperfection s are sufficient to
explain the long-run divergence in development among countries.

s.

The Effects of "Financial Repression".

More recently, a number of authors have developed models
which associate financial intermediatio n with growth. 22

As

McKinnon [1973] has emphasized, governments in many developing
countries have repressed financial markets and hampered the
formation of financial intermediatio n.

Following Williamson

[1986], we are able to examine the effects of "financial
repression" by comparing an economy under intermediated lending
with another economy in which financial intermediatio n is
suppressed.
Suppose that financial intermediatio n is prohibited. The

22

See, for example, Bencivenga and Smith [1991] or Greenwood
and Jovanovic [1990].
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costs of the impossibility of intermediation can be captured in
such a manner that monitoring costs may be greater in direct
lending than in an intermediated economy.

In direct lending, a

duplication of monitoring may occur when borrowers are insolvent.
If parameter values satisfy 2 wt~ 0 < 3 Wt, two lenders must
match one entrepreneur in contractual arrangements.

In the event

where the borrower defaults, two lenders monitors the borrower
independently, thus 2p units of effort are spent for monitoring.
If 3 Wt~ 0 < 4 Wt, 3P units are spent, and so on.
The duplication of monitoring thus leads to an increase in
the monitoring costs incurred by lenders, which tends to force
lenders to contract credit supply in order to maintain
their reservation utility. The effects are represented by a
downward shift of n(. ).

In a regime with a unique interior

steady state, the steady state capital-labor ratio becomes
smaller. In another regime with multiple steady states, the
steady state in which all borrowers receive loans may disappear.
Then, the government policy to repress intermediation generates
the long-run divergence in income levels among intermediated
economies and economies where intermediation is suppressed.

6. Income Redistribution and the Long-Run state.

Let us examine the effects of income redistribution between
lenders and borrowers. suppose that entrepreneurs receive TWt
units of the consumption good as transfer from the government
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when young and the governmen t levies
(1 - a) -rW

a

t

as a lump-sum tax on each lender to finance the revenue for the
transfer. Given this transfer scheme, (18) is written as
(18 11 )

where

the redistribu tion from lenders to borrowers increases the long
run capital-la bor ratio through the downward shift of them(. )
curve. Transfer to borrowers mitigate credit constrain ts through
the net worth effect, leading to an expansion of credit supplied
by intermedi aries. Furthermo re, for some critical value of
T0 ,

T

=

the system bifurcate s when the model has multiple steady

states. As small change in

T

around

To

drastical ly changes the

dynamic behavior of the model ( see Figure SA, SB, and SC),
leading to a large change in the long-run capital-la bor ratio.

7. The Closed Economy and the unique Steady state.

In this section we investiga te a closed economy in which any
agent can not have access to foreign safe assets with a constant
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interest rate. The only riskless asset available to any agent is
bank deposits, and then the deposit rate of interest is
determined to satisfy the market clearing for the deposit market.
Now the deposit market clears to satisfy

where the L.H.S. is the aggregate supply of loans and the R.H.S.
the aggregate demand for loans. Suppose that the equilibrium is
defined by CRE, 23

and thus the deposit rate of interest

evolves according to

(22)

over the whole region. To confine attention on an economy where
the steady state is interior, we impose the following Assumption.

Assumption 4

23

The conditions under which equilibrium is CRE over the
whole region are A 1 ( . ) ~ 1, and A" (. ) ~ O, where A(. ) is defined
in the Appendix [2].
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Under Assumption 4, there is a unique interior stationary state
in a closed economy. As shown in Figure 6A, given any initial
state ko

€

(

o, ~axl, the interior stationary state is unique

and dynamically stable. 24 Denoting the L.H.S. of (22) by Z( kt,
kt+l ), we obtain

z1 (

• ) >

0 and Z2 ( • ) <

o. Substituting (21)

into (22), rt is defined only in terms of kt, such that

The first term in the L.H.S. represents the net worth effect.
Other things being equal, the deposit rate of interest is higher
as capital intensity increases. The second term captures other
two effects which state that, other things being equal, the
deposit rate of interest rate is lower as capital intensity
increases. When the net worth effect is negligible, the deposit
rate of interest rate is monotonic decreasing. However, when the
effect matters, it may not be monotone. Figure 6B illustrates a
case where the deposit rate of interest fluctuates as capital
intensity increases.

Proposition 4

The sufficient condition for the non-monotoni c behavior of
the interest rate is that drt/dkt >Oat the interior steady
state capital-labo r ratio k* ( > o ).

k*

=

24 Without Assumption 4, the steady state is unique,
that is,
~ax·
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In contrast with the small open economy, the net worth
effect never leads to multiple steady state, but generates the
non-monotonic behavior of the interest rate. This implies that
the net worth effect is not sufficient to generate multiple
steady states. This result is sharply contrasted with Diamond
[1965] because in his model multiple steady states may be viable
in a closed economy, but disappear in a small open economy.

The

non-monotonic behavior suggests that, even if the interest rate
of foreign asset is less than the steady state interest rate in
the closed economy, openness of the domestic deposit market to
world markets may not increase the long-run capital intensity.
Too hasty liberalization of the domestic capital market may
derive the economy down to the underdevelopment trap.

a. conclusion
The model developed in this paper contains an important
implication for the link between economic development and
financial development. The initial wealth level is the driving
force behind development. Poverty generates poverty, while wealth
generates wealth under capital market imperfections. A country
that is richer in early stages is more likely to achieve a long
run richer state.
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Appendix

[1) Characterization of No Credit Rationing Equilibria (NCRE)
If equilibria are NCRE, the marginal entrepreneur is defined
by the borrower with

Pt,

who is indifferent between two

investment opportunities, the risky project and the safe asset,
given the quoted interest payment xt, such that
(15)

where xt is a smallest one to satisfy the intermediary's
individual rationality condition,
(24)

Using (2), (2'), and (17'), from (24), implicitly we obtain

with

rw1 < 0,

and
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= -

1t

R

f" +

1t

13

@

)

0,

1tx

where

and

Denote
and

Using (15) (17') , and (2 4) , from the application of the ilnplicit
function theorem, there exists a continuously differentiable
function

satisfying
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with

[2] Switching between CRE and NCRE

Equilibria are CRE if the expected profit of the marginal
entrepreneur exceeds the profit from the alternative safe
investment, such that
[i]

At 2µRt+l - Pt
µRt+ 1 - .., -.,,......,=---- > r0 '
2J.LRt+1

while equilibria are NCRE if otherwise, such that
[ii]

At 2µRt+l - Pt
µRt+l - .., - - - - - < r0 ,
2µRt+l

which are restatements of (14) and (14').
[i] and [ii] are replaced by

Using (11), conditions
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[iii]

and
(iv]

The L.H.S. of (iii] ( or [iv] ) is increasing in kt+l' and the
R.H.S. is increasing in kt, and Pt, Wt, and ~+l are continuous on
[ O, ~ax]. Thus, there exists a unique continuous function

satisfying

with

with A' ( . )

2
w_'
_
f_
- - > o,
and
1 1
11

= ___

(3(2(3 f

-

f

A(O) = O.

)

Equilibria are CRE if kt+l > A( kt), while equilibria are NCRE
if kt+l < A( kt). In CRE, kt evolves according to kt+l =¢(kt),
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satisfying

with

n( ¢(kt)) = m( kt), while in NCRE, kt evolves according

to kt+l = t( kt), satisfying

Proposition 5
(I) In CRE, kt+l =¢(kt) <

W(

kt), and (II) in NCRE, kt+l =

¢(kt) < t( kt).

Proof.

First, prove (I). Suppose to the contrary that, in CRE,

which implies that, given kt, the next capital level kt+l in CRE
is strictly greater than kt+l in NCRE. Denote variables of NCRE
by superscript "N". Since kt+l > kt+lN,
(i)

Pt > Pf,

and

must be satisfied from (17) and (2'), where PtN and Rt+iN satisfy
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(ii)

given kt· The following conditions must be satisfied
(iii)

N

ilt+l

Rt+1

The first inequality arises from the fact that the second term is
the feasible maximum interest payment of the borrower with PtN,
and the second inequality arises from (i). From (i), (ii), and
(iii), the expected profit of the marginal entrepreneur must be
strictly negative, such that

which is a contradiction. Thus, if equilibria are CRE,

¢(kt) <

Second, prove (II). Suppose to the contrary that, in NCRE,

which implies that, given kt, the next capital level kt+l in NCRE
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is strictly greater than kt+l in CRE. Since kt+l < kt+iN,
(i)

Pt < Pf,

and

(ii)

given kt. Then,
(iii)

Lemma 2

if

Proof. First, suppose to the contrary that

where
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Since kt+l =¢(kt), kt+l in r(. ) must correspond to the
marginal cost of the marginal entrepreneur, Pt= PC kt+l ). Then,
by definition, r(. ) must be the interest payment which maximizes
the intermediary's profit, Because n(. ) is strictly concave,
this is a contradiction.
Second, suppose to the contrary that

Then, there exists a smaller interest payment less than x( kt+l)
which strictly increases the entrepreneur's profit given that the
intermediary's IR condition is satisfied. A contradiction. Q.E.D.

Using Lemma 2, (iii) is replaced by
(iv)

µ,Rt+ 1

-

r8 -

Pt 2µ,Rt+l - Pt >
o,
Rt+l

2µ, - - - - - - - - -

which is a contradiction. Q.E.D.

Therefore, the motion of the capital-labor ratio is, in
general, described as
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In Figure 7, one typical case involving both regions of CRE and
NCRE is illustrated, where the lower boundary of~(. ) and

w(. )

characterizes the equilibria.

[3] The proof of the existence of a unique interior steady state.
Prove this using an example. Assume the parameter values: a
= 0.76, a= 0.5, µ = 0.25, b = 2, r = 1, with c =

1
4(1-a)µ
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Then,

and

-o. s k o. s
2 • 5 ( 0 • 5 k t+l
- t+l
n ( kt+l ) =
k-o.s
t+l

)2

By (13), the whole interval is
(1-1) 0 ~kt~ Jsnax

=

0.3.

Steady states values of k satisfy n( k) = m( k ). Denoting ko.s

= X, definer( X) by

r( x) - x4 - o.s x2 - o.4 ex+ 0.25,
where r( X) = o implies n( k) = m( k ), with the whole interval
0 ~ X ~ X.Uax

=

0.3o.s.

Then, a sufficient condition that there exists at least one
k satisfying n( k) = m( k)

o.

Since r(

satisfying

for 0 < k < 0.3 is r( 0 )r( X.Uax) <

o) = 0.25, it suffices to show that there exist

8
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(1-2)

re

Xmax) = 0.08 - 0.4 8 0.3°· 5 <

o,

given Assumption 1, 3 and (14). Assumption 1 implies that
(1-3)

0.5•0.3°• 5 = 0.274 < 8.

Assumption 3 is satisfied since 0.5 ( 0.3 )-o. 5 - 0.3°· 5 >

o.

Denote the L.H.S of (14) by n( k ):

n( k ) = 2. 5 ( 0. 25 k-o. 5

ko. 5 + 2 kl. 5

-

) •

The first-derivative gives

n1 ( q )

= 2. 5k-1. 5 ( k -

l

+

{i ) (

12

k -

l

-

{i ) .

12

For o :s; k :s; 0.3,
0.3 = arg min n( k ),
k

with
(1-4)

n( 0.3) = 0.5934.

Hence,

(14) is

0.5934 > 8.

Therefore, 0.2/0.3°· 5 < 8 < 0.5934 satisfy (1-2)

(1-3) and (1-4).

[4] The proof of Proposition 2
Prove this using an example. Suppose that a= 0.388, a=
0.5, µ =

25

1
r = 1, b = 2, with c = - - - -30
1.6'
4(1-a)µ

n(k)

and
m(k) = 8 - 0.5k 0 • 5 •
By (13), the whole interval satisfies

We obtain
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(2-1) 0

~

k

~

Jsnax =

0.45.

Assume that
(2-2) n( 0.45 ) > m( 0.45 ) ,
which leads to 8 < 0.34088. Since n( 0) > m( 0 ), it suffices to
demonstra te that there exists some k satisfying n( k) < m( k ),
given Assumptio n 1, 3, and (14), for 0 < k < 0.45.
Assumptio n 1 implies that
(2-3) 0.5 ( 0.45 ) 0 · 5

=

0.3354 < 6.

Assumptio n 3 is satisfied since 0.5 ( 0.45 )-o. 5 - 0.45°· 5 > o.
For o

~

k

~

0.45,

1 + .fi = arg min n(k), with n( 1
+
12
k
12

.fi)

Hence,

(14) is

(2-4)

0.3489 > 8.

=

0.3489.

By (2-3) and (2-4), at least 0.3355 < 6 < 0.3488 satisfy the
three condition s. Suppose that 6
m(0.4). Q.E.D.

=

0.34, then we obtain n(0.4) <
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